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We test for evidence of corporate misgovernance at the World Bank. Most 
major decisions at the World Bank are made by its Board of Executive 
Directors. However, in any given year the majority of the Bank’s member 
countries do not get a chance to serve on this powerful body. In this paper, 
we empirically investigate whether board membership leads to higher 
funding from the World Bank’s two main development financing institutions, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA). We find that developing 
countries serving on the Board of Executive Directors can expect an 
approximate doubling of funding from the IBRD. In absolute terms, countries 
serving on the board are rewarded with an average $60 million “bonus” in 
IBRD loans. This is more likely driven by soft forces like boardroom culture 
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1   Introduction 
 
Any large public organization faces a challenge of representation and 
management. Since all decisions cannot be made by all members, founders often 
grant a more nimble body with decision-making powers. But representatives on 
the decision-making body may face a temptation to govern in the interests of 
their own wallet or narrow constituency rather than in the interests of the larger 
body.  
Recently-convicted U.S. Senator from Alaska, Ted Stevens, serves as a vivid 
example. As The New York Times reported:  
In his four decades in the Senate, and especially in his former role as chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Stevens dispensed untold millions of dollars 
worth of favors, especially to his home state. He clearly felt no compunction about 
accepting favors in return (Oct 2008).  
 
While representing Alaska in the Senate, Stevens and his friends received tens 
of thousands of dollars in illegal gifts. And while chairing the powerful 
appropriations committee, he favored his home state at the expense of others. 
This anecdote is not an isolated example. Since the seminal work of Ferejohn 
(1974), political scientists have found that membership on powerful committees 
allows members of the U.S. Congress to bring home the “bacon” to their 
constituencies (Ray 1981; Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee 1996; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; 
Rundquist and Carsey 2002). There is a parallel, though surprisingly thin, literature 
in corporate finance and law that examines how corporate board members can 2 
 
benefit from their positions at the expense of the larger company (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2004; Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006). 
With all this work in the domestic arena, surprisingly no studies have 
empirically investigated misgovernance at an international appropriations 
committee.1 This is a significant omission. After all, there are large bodies of 
research that examine the distributive outcomes of international organizations 
without taking into account their institutional structure. Moreover, given the 
nature of the international system, members of international organizations—
unlike states in Congress—do not have equal access to the most powerful 
international bodies. Thus by exploring the political dynamics and corporate 
governance of an international appropriations committee we not only learn 
about international organizations but also the nature of the international system 
itself. 
In this paper we examine the politics of corporate governance at the world’s 
largest appropriations committee, the World Bank’s Board of Executive 
Directors. In 2008, the Bank’s two primary component institutions – the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) – committed nearly $25 billion in 
loans and grants through some 300 development projects around the globe.  The 
IBRD offers low-interest loans to middle and lower-income developing countries. 
                                                 
1 In a study close in spirit to this exercise, Hsieh and Moretti (2006) examine corruption and misgovernance 
in the oil-for-food arrangement between Iraq and the United Nations. 3 
 
The IDA, on the other hand, exclusively focuses on the world’s poorest and 
neediest countries. Each of these institutions is overseen by a Board of Executive 
Directors. The Board of Executive Directors approves all projects and policies of 
the Bank. The President of the Bank serves as the chair of the board, while all 
other seats are given to representatives of share-holding countries.  
The Articles of Agreement outline a procedure by which multiple countries 
are often represented by a single Executive Director, who serves a two-year term. 
Five of the twelve seats originally allotted to the board were to be appointed by 
the five largest shareholding countries. The remaining seven would be elected by 
all of the Banks’ member countries. Since the Bank’s founding, the number of 
elected seats on the board has been increased to 19. Thus, in any given year, the 
vast majority of member states find their interests represented by another nation.  
This paper tests whether members of this international appropriations 
committee bring more Bank funds to their home countries. We find a strong 
effect for the IBRD. Yet a simple correlation may not be all that interesting. After 
all, a seat on the board may allow countries to draw attention to their legitimate 
development needs, or a country may be elected to oversee Bank loans that it has 
already been granted. A board seat may also reflect a country’s rise in 
international prestige, which independently brings about World Bank projects. 
These explanations are not entirely troubling. We argue, however, that the data 
are better explained by self-serving behavior in which the Executive Board is 4 
 
used as a platform to channel more or greater Bank loans and grants to the home 
countries of the directors.  
Our results are quite stark: we find that countries receive a large increase in 
Bank loans and grants during years when they have a seat on the board. 
Specifically, we find that developing countries serving on the Board of Executive 
Directors can expect an approximate doubling of funding from the IBRD. In 
absolute terms, countries serving on the board are rewarded with an average $60 
million “bonus” in IBRD loans. Only the time on the board, and not the years 
before or after, is associated with increased commitments. Additionally, 
developing countries representing seats with a higher “effective vote”, that is, 
seats shared by richer countries that are themselves uninterested in IBRD loans, 
tend to get larger increases. 
Interestingly, the same results are not borne out by the data on IDA funding. 
We find no significant association between board membership and IDA loan and 
grant commitments. The difference in our IBRD and IDA results may be 
explained by the difference in their missions and funding policies. Interestingly, 
the IDA has allocated funding according to a performance- and poverty-based 
formula since 1977 (IDA 2004), while GDP per capita and regional equity have 
been of central concern since the organization’s very early years (Kapur, Lewis, 
and Webb 1997).  
While our findings for the IBRD are extremely robust, we note a result that 
points towards a view of Executive Board power coming from being “around the 5 
 
table” as opposed to wholly from the mathematical allotment of voting power 
itself. Alternate board members—who are usually present but not voting—
receive similar increases in commitments. With this lack of distinction, it may be 
that the boardroom culture of the IBRD Board of Executive Directors rewards 
insiders while not distinguishing greatly between them. 
This paper is closest to the work examining the rewards of membership in the 
UN Security Council, which finds that temporary members experience increases 
in aid from the United States, United Nations, IMF, and World Bank (Kuziemko 
and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and 
Vreeland 2009). The Security Council, however, is not an appropriations 
committee, and the mechanisms through which temporary members receive 
more aid surely involve complex channels of global politics. The World Bank 
Executive Directors, on the other hand, control purse strings directly. This simple 
channel has far simpler ramifications for monitoring and institutional design. 
Finding that countries can take advantage of their position of power has 
implications for other international appropriations committees like the European 
Union, IMF, regional development banks, and UN agencies. 
The remainder of this paper presents the background and results of our 
empirical analysis. In Part 2, we provide a brief primer on the World Bank and its 
decision-making structures, with particular emphasis on the Bank’s Board of 
Executive Directors. In Part 3, we introduce our data and explain the empirical 
methodology underlying our analysis. Part 4 presents the results, while Part 5 6 
 
examines whether the IBRD bonus varies by country characteristics. Part 6 
concludes. 
 
2   The World Bank 
In the wake of World War II, the major world powers set up an international 
economic order composed of three main institutions: the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an international trade regime now known as the   
World Trade Organization (WTO); the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
devoted to monetary cooperation; and the World Bank, with the mission of 
financing post-war reconstruction and development (Gavin and Rodrik 1995). 
Since the World Bank’s founding in 1944, its purpose has gradually shifted. As 
Europe rebuilt and the Bank’s membership expanded to include many countries 
from disparate parts of the world, its focus on development became more global 
in nature. 
Today, the World Bank has 185 member countries. Originally, it was just 
composed of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
In 1960, the IBRD was joined by the International Development Association 
(IDA). The IBRD and the IDA, together with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), constitute 
the World Bank Group today. Reconstruction continues to constitute an 7 
 
important component of the Bank’s activities, particularly dealing with the 
aftermath of natural disasters and wars. But the Bank has “broadened [its] 
portfolio’s focus to include social sector lending projects, poverty alleviation, 
debt relief and good governance,” and views poverty reduction as the 
“overarching goal of all its work” (World Bank 2007). In addition to directing 
credit to developing countries, the Bank has become very influential as a source 
of ideas and practices in the field of international development (Gavin and 
Rodrik 1995). In recent years, it claims to have focused its efforts on achieving its 
antipoverty mission within the framework of the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
The two main branches of the World Bank, the IBRD and the IDA, perform 
different functions that contribute to its broader mission. The IBRD, the historical 
core of the Bank’s operations, now directs credit mainly to middle-income and 
creditworthy poorer countries (World Bank 2007). The IDA is especially geared 
towards the world’s neediest countries – countries that fall below a certain 
income threshold, have poor credit ratings, or in some other way require special 
assistance. The IDA is more responsive to short-term disasters and emergencies 
and has the power to negotiate the income ceiling under special circumstances, 
although a strong norm for allocative guidelines has been around since at least 
1964 (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 1152). Since 1977, an explicit formula, the 
“Performance-Based Allocation System,” has been employed as the basis for 
distributing funds. This system now takes into account at least 16 criteria from 8 
 
macroeconomic management to gender equality when determining how much 
credit can be distributed to recipient nations (IDA 2004). 
Despite its generally respected mission, the World Bank has come under fire 
for its policies and management by critics of globalization, among others. While 
Gavin and Rodrik (1995) tout the Bank’s role as a major source of ideas in the 
field of development – a source of ideas with money to back them up – the 
Bretton Woods institutions are often criticized for being too forceful in tying 
money to specific country policies or actions. This conditionality in World Bank 
and IMF projects and programs is attacked for the policies it requires, such as 
trade liberalization, and for its effect on the sovereignty of country governments 
(Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995, Kovach and Lansman 2006). The transparency 
of the Bank’s operations continues to come under scrutiny despite a significant 
increase in information made available after some widely publicized internal 
reforms (Global Transparency Initiative 2006). Some critics suggest that the 
Bank’s lending hinders development, for example, by burdening countries with 
massive debts (Shah 2006). Others criticize the environmental impact of Bank 
projects (BBC 2003). Corruption in Bank operations has also raised serious 
concerns (Knight and Pound 2006). The criticisms of the World Bank peaked 
during the Bank and IMF’s annual meetings in 1994, the institutions’ 50th 
anniversary. Organizations like the ‘50 Years is Enough’ network led the charge 
during these meetings in Madrid, greeting them with criticism and street 
protests. 9 
 
The Bank acknowledges some of its critics, even prominently noting concerns 
on its web site. It claims that World Bank Group institutions have been working 
“separately and in collaboration – to improve internal efficiency and external 
effectiveness” (World Bank 2007). In recent years, there has been a noticeable 
effort on the part of the World Bank to, at the very least, create the impression 
that it is interested in actively engaging national governments and segments of 
civil society in its operations (BBC 2003). Among other efforts, the Bank launched 
the ‘Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy’ to address these concerns (2003). 
During the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, the major industrialized 
countries agreed to forgive the debts of 18 mostly African developing countries 
(BBC 2005). 
While there has been significant discussion of the World Bank, the academic 
discourse and literature regarding the institutional structure of the Bank, 
particularly political-economic literature, is relatively thin. Woods, a political 
scientist at Oxford University, has published a number of papers regarding the 
Bretton Woods institutions. She scrutinizes the structure of the World Bank, 
questioning its ability to address concerns regarding accountability and national 
sovereignty and calling for “a structure of representation which better reflects the 
stakes of all state members” (2001). Hexner (1964) considers the role of the Board 
of Executive Directors at the IMF, which is designed similarly to the World Bank.  
Neither of these studies provides broad-based empirical support. 
 10 
 
2.1 Membership and Voting Power2 
The World Bank is structured like many major corporations and banks. 
However, it is solely owned by countries, which serve as its shareholders. The 
IBRD currently has 185 shareholding member countries while the IDA has 166. 
Each member country is required to purchase a certain ‘quota’ or number of 
shares based on a special formula that essentially accounts for its weight in the 
world economy (Woods 2001). The shareholders are technically the ultimate 
authority in Bank decisions. Each country is assigned a certain number of votes 
in broad, high-level Bank decision-making that is related to the number of shares 
it owns. These votes serve as an explicit valuation of a country’s power within 
the institution. The Articles of Agreement allocate 250 basic votes to each 
country, plus one additional vote for each share of stock held. While the 250 basic 
votes are a concession to the principle of equality, tremendous growth in the 
total number of shares has marginalized their value. At their peak in 1955, the 
basic votes comprised 14 percent of the votes at the Bank; by 2001, this number 
had decreased to around 3 percent (Woods 2001). 
 
2.2 Decision-making and Election of Executive Directors3 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise cited, all facts in this section should be cited as (World Bank 1944), for 
information from the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement, or (World Bank 2007). 
3 Unless otherwise cited, all facts in this section should be cited as (World Bank 1944) 
for procedural information from the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement, or (World Bank 
2007). 11 
 
Each member country appoints a ‘governor’ and an ‘alternate governor’ to serve 
on the IBRD’s Board of Governors for a five-year term. Usually, these governors 
are finance ministers or ministers of development in the member countries. If the 
country is also a member of the IDA, then the governor serves ex officio on the 
IDA Board of Governors, as well. While it is officially the highest authority at the 
Bank, the Board of Governors only meets once per year at the World Bank’s 
Annual Meetings each July. Governors “admit or suspend members, increase or 
decrease the authorized capital stock, determine the distribution of net income, 
review financial statements and budgets, and exercise other powers that they 
have not delegated to the Executive Directors.” 
The Board of Governors delegates all powers not expressly reserved for the 
governors in the Articles of Agreement to the Board of Executive Directors. Thus, 
the Board of Executive Directors is responsible for the general operations of the 
Bank and makes important day-to-day decisions. The Board of Executive 
Directors meets regularly and is responsible for approving Bank loan and grant 
proposals put forth by the management. Executive directors report to the Board 
of Governors on Bank operations, accounts, and other matters during the Bank’s 
Annual Meetings. 
As having a board that includes all member countries would be unwieldy 
and inefficient, the Articles of Agreement establish a procedure by which 
multiple countries are represented by one executive director. Five of the original 
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twelve executive directors were to be appointed by the five largest shareholding 
countries. The remaining seven would be elected by the Bank’s member 
countries and serve two-year terms. 
The election of executive directors generally occurs every two years at the 
Bank’s Annual Meetings. Each member country’s governor may cast the number 
of votes allotted to his or her country (see Section 2.1) for one candidate. The 
seven candidates receiving the greatest number of votes are elected as long as 
they each receive at least 14 percent of the total vote. If a candidate receives less 
than 14 percent, there are provisions for additional balloting until all positions 
are filled. Since the founding of the Bank, the number of elected executive 
directors has been increased by the Board of Governors from seven to 19, leading 
to a total of 24 today.  
Additional election rules, which must be adopted by the Board of Governors 
prior to each election, customarily help ensure geographic diversity. As with 
governors, each IBRD executive director serves as an ex officio member of the IDA 
Board of Executive Directors if his or her country is also a member of the IDA. 
During the conduct of regular business, each executive director is responsible for 
casting, as a unit, the votes of all the countries whose votes he or she received 
during elections. He or she may also appoint an alternate to assume full power 
and responsibilities in his or her absence at board meetings. When the executive 
director is present, the alternate may still participate in the meeting, but cannot 13 
 
vote.  In general, matters before the board are decided on the basis of a majority 
vote. 
It is this decision-making structure of the World Bank that motivates our 
empirical analysis. Most countries cannot serve on the Board of Executive 
Directors at a given time, making executive directors responsible for representing 
the varied interests of the Bank’s diverse membership in important decision-
making. Since directors are to represent the interests of the whole, they ought not 
to use their temporary influence to further their own countries’ agendas. 
Moreover, many countries rarely or never have the opportunity to serve on the 
board (see Tables II-a and II-b); higher Bank funding for countries that do get to 
serve might be seen as an unfair privilege. 
 
3   Data and Methodology 
The question motivating our analysis lends itself to a fairly clean empirical 
strategy. We seek to determine whether countries serving on the World Bank’s 
Board of Executive Directors are able to use this position of influence to bring 
more Bank funding to their own countries. The empirical strategy we use is to 
observe how the approval of World Bank commitments to countries varies as a 
function of whether those countries have a seat on the board. A simple 
correlation between board membership and loan commitments is not, in itself, 
necessarily illuminating. Factors that affect a country’s likelihood of serving on 14 
 
the Board of Executive Directors and its likeliness to receive World Bank funding 
could bias this result. Furthermore, countries might use a seat on the board as a 
platform to draw attention to their legitimate development needs. Using the 
methods described in this section, we provide empirical support for the 
hypothesis that board membership itself, rather than alternative explanations, is 
driving a positive association between Bank funding commitments and board 
membership.  We call this the pork-barreling hypothesis. 
We construct a panel dataset (see Data, Means, and Variances statistics in 
Table I-a) featuring countries that have been members of the World Bank at any 
point since its founding. We limit these countries to IDA Part II members, a 
designation generally given to developing countries. Our main dependent 
variables are approved loan commitments from the IBRD and approved loan and 
grant commitments from the IDA. Data on all World Bank development projects 
since 1946 are readily available on its website, but we restrict our sample to post 
1961 when the IDA definition began. We sum all funding commitments for a 
given country in a given year to determine the total amount of funding that was 
approved for that country-year, both for the IBRD and the IDA. We convert these 
values into 1996 US dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Urban 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Since the project database contains only approved 
loan commitments, countries eligible but not receiving funding are omitted. In 
order to include these country-years in the dataset, we assign them values of 15 
 
zero. In specifications using the logarithm of Bank commitments as the 
dependent variable, we set these values to a negligible $1 (since ln(1)=0). 
While not in a readily usable format, a wealth of information and data are 
available in the World Bank’s Annual Reports. We use the information available 
in these documents to construct three key variables. First, we create a dummy 
variable representing whether a country is serving on the Board of Executive 
Directors in a given year. We call this variable ‘Board Member.’ The number of 
times each country in the dataset has served on the IBRD and the IDA’s boards, 
which we refer to as the ‘Service’ variable, is shown in Table IIa and IIb, 
respectively. More than half the countries who were members of the World Bank 
at some point since its founding have never gotten the opportunity to serve on 
the board – including countries from Afghanistan and Albania to Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Some countries, such as Pakistan, India, and Colombia, have served 
many times. Since terms on the board begin and end in the middle of the 
calendar year while all other data is in calendar years, there is a half-year lag 
effect that must be accounted for in interpreting the results of our analysis. We 
also create a similar variable, called ‘Alternate Board Member’, to reflect the 
same information for alternate directors. The summary statistics found in Table I-
a are broken down in Table I-b by full board members, alternate board members, 
and other countries. 
Second, we construct a variable that indicates the amount of voting power 
assigned to each Bank member country, based on its number of World Bank 16 
 
shares, before it hands it off to the executive director representing it on the board. 
We call this variable ‘Bank Voting Power.’ The amount of bank voting power a 
country has may be an indication of the amount of pull that country has within 
the institution. Countries with greater voting power and, consequently, more 
power within the Bank, might have a better chance at landing coveted 
development projects, regardless of board membership, and a better chance of 
getting a seat on the Board of Executive Directors. Therefore, in the case of a 
positive correlation between board membership and funding commitments, one 
might suspect that the latent voting power each country has based on its 
membership and shareholding rather than the board seat itself might be driving 
the positive effect. 
Third, we use the data available in the annual reports to construct a variable 
containing the aggregate voting power each board member wields in making 
board decisions. This variable is calculated by dividing each executive director’s 
votes (equal to the sum of the general bank votes of each country the executive 
director represents) by the total votes available in that year. We refer to this 
variable as ‘Board Voting Power.’ While the ‘Board Member’ variable is a 
dummy variable that identifies whether or not a country is serving on the board 
in a given year, this scalar variable takes into account the fact that all board seats 
are not created equal, scaling membership by the amount of aggregate voting 
power of each seat. 17 
 
We test the pork-barreling hypothesis using two main types of specifications. 
The main model is a fixed effects regression, and the second is an ‘event-time 
specification’ in which we continue to use fixed effects but analyze trends before 
and after membership (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). After running these main 
specifications, we conduct robustness checks and perform additional tests to see 
whether some types of board members are systematically more effective in 
bringing home increased aid. Our main specifications use the logarithm of World 
Bank funding commitments as the dependent variable. We also use absolute 
levels of commitments and a logit model in alternate specifications. Additionally, 
we compare loan receipts by countries with executive directors with those 
represented by alternate directors in order to examine whether it is the vote 
itself, or a more complex institutional explanation, that can explain increased 
loans. All specifications include standard errors that are clustered at the country 
level. 
We run all of the specifications described in this section on both IBRD 
commitments and IDA commitments. We also use the same set of control 
variables in these regressions. There are a number of factors that might influence 
the amount of World Bank loans a country could expect and its probability of 
serving on the Board of Executive Directors.  
In addition to the ‘Bank Voting Power’ variable described above, we control 
for a number of other factors. We control for real per capita GDP since it would 
seem that lower income countries should get more loans since they are in the 18 
 
greatest need. However, richer developing countries may be better investments 
and therefore more attractive for World Bank aid. Additionally, richer 
developing countries may have greater political influence due to their higher 
economic standing, potentially contributing to their chances at serving on the 
board. We also control for the size of a country’s population, another factor that 
might influence the amount of funding commitments it receives and its 
likelihood of being elected to the board. Both real per capita GDP and population 
data are available from the year 1950 in the Penn World Tables. We take the 
logarithm of these values when including them in our data set. 
We also control for two political variables that could have a significant impact 
on World Bank lending decisions. First, we control for the occurrence of a major 
war in a given country-year. Countries in which a major war has occurred might 
be attractive for development and reconstruction loans. On the other hand, an 
ongoing major war might cause the international lending institution to shy away 
from investments in the war-torn country.  In order to control for such effects, we 
use a dummy variable, using data from the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute in 
Oslo, indicating the occurrence of a war with at least 1,000 battle deaths. Second, 
we control for the political climate in a country (whether its government can be 
characterized as a democracy, autocracy, or somewhere in between) using the 
‘Polity 2’ variable offered by the University of Maryland’s Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management in its Polity IV data set. We 19 
 
refer to this variable, coded as a score from -10 (perfect autocracy) to +10 (perfect 
democracy) as the ‘Political Climate’ variable. These factors might affect both the 
ability of a country to get elected to the Board of Executive Directors and its 
attractiveness for World Bank loans and grants. 
 
3.1 Primary Fixed Effects Specification 
Even after controlling for the variables described above, there are other omitted 
effects that could bias our estimate of the value of a seat on the Board of 
Executive Directors in terms of World Bank funding commitments. In order to 
account for such bias, we control for country and year fixed effects in our main 
specification. Trends in World Bank funding over time will be absorbed by the 
year fixed effects while omitted variables that affect individual countries’ 
average loan receipts will be absorbed by the country fixed effects. The primary 
logarithmic fixed effects regression is as follows:  
 
ln(Loan Commitments) = β0 + β1(Board Member)it 
+ β2(Bank Voting Power)it + β3(X)it + γt + δi + εit (1) 
 
where ‘Loan Commitments’ represents the amount of money committed by 
either the IBRD or the IDA to a country in a given year; ‘Board Member’ is a 
dummy variable for whether or not a country has a seat on the Board of 20 
 
Executive Directors; ‘X’ is a vector of time-varying Bank, political, and economic 
controls for each country; γ is a vector of year fixed effects; and δ is a vector of 
country fixed effects. Note that the half-year lag due to board terms beginning 
and ending in the middle of the calendar year (causing the last year a country is 
indicated as serving as an executive director before leaving the board to actually 
be only a half-year of service) may bias estimates of β1 downwards. 
In another specification, we replace the dummy variable for board 
membership with the scalar variable ‘board voting power.’ Since each board 
member represents a different slate of countries and consequently wields a 
different amount of collective voting power on the board, all board seats are not 
created equal.  We examine how funding varies with differing amounts of voting 
power on the board by employing the specification represented by the following 
equation: 
 
ln(Loan Commitments)it = β0 + β1(Board Voting Power)it 
+ β2(Bank Voting Power)it + β3(X)it + γt + δi + εit (2) 
 
3.2 Event-Time Specification 
If countries use board membership to create awareness about their legitimate 
development needs, an increase in funding may not be entirely troubling.  To 
rule out this and other alternative explanations, we employ an “event-time 
specification” similar to that used by Kuziemko and Werker (2006): 21 
 
 
ln(Loan Commitments)it = β0 + β1(T-3)it + β2(T-2)it + β3(T-1)it 
+ β4(Board Member)it + β5(T+1)it + β6(T+2)it + β2(Bank Voting Power)it 
+ β3(X)it + γt + δi + εit (3) 
 
where ‘T - x’ is a dummy variable indicating that the year is x full calendar years 
before a country begins its term on the Board of Executive Directors and ‘T + x’ is 
a dummy variable indicating that the year is x full calendar years after the 
country has completed its term on the board. We extend our time dummies to 
the ‘T - 3’ year in order to account for the lag caused by executive director terms 
beginning during the middle of the calendar year. Because of this effect, ‘T - 1’ 
includes a half-year of board service. As with the primary fixed effects 
specification, this lag might also bias the estimate of β4 downward. 
This specification allows us to identify the effect of serving on the board by 
comparing a country’s loan commitments during years of board membership 
with those in the years immediately prior to the beginning of its term and the 
years immediately following the end of its term. A sharp increase in loan 
commitments during a country’s term compared to the years immediately before 
and after the term would help rule out alternative explanations of a positive 
association between board membership and Bank funding and lend credence to 
the pork-barreling hypothesis. 22 
 
 
4   Results 
4.1 IBRD.   
Main Specifications   
Table III-a presents the results of our main specifications – equations (1), (2), and 
(3) – for IBRD commitments. First, we regress the logarithm of IBRD funding 
commitments on just the board membership dummy variable including country 
and year fixed-effects, but excluding control variables. The results, shown in 
column (1), offer a statistically (at the 5% level) and practically significant 
estimate of the coefficient of the board membership variable. In column (2), the 
addition of control variables has a negligible effect on that estimate, which 
maintains significance at the 10% level. The results indicate that board 
membership in a given year is associated with a 138 log-point, or roughly 300%, 
increase in World Bank loans to the given country. While there are no significant 
coefficients on the per capita income, population, or political climate controls in 
any of the main IBRD specifications, we do find that the occurrence of a major 
war in a country has a statistically significant negative effect on World Bank 
loans in all of those specifications. 
In column (3), we replace the dummy variable representing board 
membership with a scalar representing the amount of voting power a country 
has on the board, with countries not serving on the board receiving a value of 23 
 
zero. The positive coefficient on board voting power, significant at the 5% level, 
suggests that an 0.1 percentage point increase in board voting power (note that 
voting power is measured as a percentage of the total amount of available voting 
power) is associated with an approximately 7.1% increase in IBRD loans. 
Column (4) reports the results of the event-time specification for the IBRD.   
When dummy variables representing the years immediately prior to and 
following board service are added to the regression, we find that the coefficient 
on board membership remains essentially unchanged – actually increasing 
slightly – and remains statistically significant at the 10% level. None of the added 
pre-entry and post-exit variables are statistically significant, nor do they show 
any clear pattern, suggesting that there is an increase in Bank loans to a country 
during years when it is serving on the board, but that that increase does not 
appear before its entry onto the board or lag after its exit. If omitted 
characteristics such as changes in a country’s reputation within the World Bank 
or changes in a country’s development needs are influencing both a country’s 
election to the Board of Executive Directors and its ability to attract Bank 
funding, we would expect to see a rise in funding not just during years of 
service, but possibly the years before and after service, as well. If countries use 
board membership as a platform to draw attention to their legitimate 
development needs, we would not expect that increased awareness to disappear 
after the country completes its board term. By helping to rule out several 
alternative hypotheses, the event-time specification lends credence to the 24 
 
hypothesis that increases in IBRD loans are closely tied to an insider bonus for 
countries serving on the board. 
 
Alternate Specifications  
In the regressions reported in Table IV, we follow-up the main IBRD regressions 
with several alternate specifications. First, we replace the dependent variable, the 
logarithm of IBRD commitments, with the absolute levels of commitments. The 
absolute regressions are included because we have no obvious ex-ante reason to 
believe that bonuses work as a proportion of existing loans. In column (1), we 
find that the board membership variable is significant at the 10% level, indicating 
an approximately $60 million board membership bonus. While the major war 
control variable ceases to be significant in this regression, a positive coefficient on 
per capita GDP, significant at the 10% level, suggests that wealthier developing 
countries may see higher Bank loans in a given year. The event-time specification 
using absolute commitment values as the dependent variable and shown in 
column (2) shows that only years of board service and the year immediately 
before board service see higher Bank loans. Since the year immediate before 
board service in our analysis actually includes the first half-year of board service 
due to a lag caused by the Bank’s election schedule (see Part 3), this result also 
confirms our findings in the main specifications. 
Next, we employ the logit model to determine whether board membership 
can explain whether or not a country received any Bank loans in a given country-25 
 
year. The results presented in columns (3) and (4) also have a positive coefficient 
on the board membership variable, suggesting a story on the extensive margin 
that is similar to what we find in our logarithmic and absolute specifications. 
Finally, we extend our IBRD analysis by adding dummy variables 
representing alternate board membership into our model. In column (5), we add 
alternate board membership to specification (1). Interestingly, while the 
coefficient estimate for board membership does not change much, the coefficient 
on the alternate board membership variable is also significant and similar in 
magnitude. A t-test comparing the coefficients on board membership and 
alternate board membership shows that there is no significant difference in the 
two estimates. The estimates of the remaining variable coefficients, including that 
of the significant major war variable, show little change from the main 
specifications without alternate membership. Since alternate board members 
may participate in board meetings but may only vote in the absence of their 
appointing executive director, the fact that we find a similar positive and 
statistically significant effect on alternate board members and full board 
members suggests that the rewards from board membership may result not just 
from the power to vote on proposals, but from the formation of an insider culture 
around the board table. However, the findings for alternate directors are not as 
robust as they are for executive directors, as demonstrated in the event-time 
specification in column (6). 
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Robustness Checks (see Tables A1 and A2) 
In a series of robustness checks, we explore potential limitations of our main 
analysis and utilize various techniques to further validate the findings explained 
above. In the regressions presented in Table A1, we address problems that could 
arise due to the inclusion of countries that have never served on the Board of 
Executive Directors and country-years with zero IBRD commitment values.  
It is possible that our estimate of the returns to board service may be skewed 
by the inclusion of countries that have never served on the board. In column (1) 
of this table, we run the main logarithmic specification after dropping all 
countries in the data that never served on the board.  The coefficient estimate for 
the board member variable barely budges, and remains significant at the 5% 
level. A similar scenario plays out for the event-time specification without zero 
service countries in column (2). In column (3), we find that even when zero 
service countries are dropped from the data, board membership retains its 
approximately $60 million bonus, significant at the 10% level. We also re-run the 
logit specification in our alternate specification after dropping the zero service 
values in column (4). We find that this treatment has a negligible impact on our 
estimates, with the coefficient on board membership retaining its positive 
direction. 
In the remainder of the robustness checks listed in Table A1, we test our 
analysis for problems that might arise from zero IBRD commitment values. 
Under the logarithmic specification, small absolute movements around zero get 27 
 
magnified to large proportional changes. To validate our results in the face of 
these potential problems, we re-run several regressions after raising all zero 
commitment values to 12.5, a value just below the lowest non-zero logarithmic 
commitment value in the data. Upon re-running the main country fixed-effects 
specification from equation (1) with the raised ‘zero’ values, we find that the 
board membership variable remains significant at the 5% level, with the effect 
mechanically smaller but still very high. These results suggest that countries 
serving on the board can still expect an approximately 73% increase in Bank 
funding. The event-time specification with raised zero values in column (6) 
shows a similar trend further validating its counterpart in the main 
specifications. This regression also exhibits a smaller yet still significant effect of 
board membership on funding, while dummy variables for the years 
immediately preceding and following board service are small and statistically 
insignificant. 
Columns (7) and (8) show that dropping zero service values and rasing zero 
commitment values, respectively, have a similar effect on the specifications in 
which we include alternate directors as they do to the specifications just 
described.  
  In Table A2, we replace the board member variable with a placebo – board 
membership ten years prior – to see whether we still find the same effect. If we 
were to find a similar effect by entering the “wrong” years before service, that 
would suggest that there was something structurally questionable with our 28 
 
estimation strategy. In the country fixed-effects specifications treated with the 
placebo in columns (1) and (2), respectively, we find no positive coefficient on 
the placebo variable.   
For each group of countries in the World Bank (whose interests are 
represented by a single Executive Director) there are different expectations for 
who will represent the group as a whole. For most groups, member states—at 
least the larger ones—take turns on the board. But for a handful of groups, such 
as the one including India, one country always maintains the seat. In columns (3) 
and (4), we drop those groups that do not allow meaningful rotation. The same 
patterns remain. 
Another way to conceive of the empirical specification is to take 
advantage of this group data. In particular, in columns (5) and (6) we add group-
year fixed effects. This specification essentially compares countries who serve on 
the board to the countries in their group who are not on the board. The same 
patterns remain, though the coefficient using the absolute level of commitments 
loses over half its magnitude. 
  The results of the robustness checks presented in Tables A1 and A2 
described here help confirm the results of our main specifications by addressing 
potential concerns facing our analysis. 
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Table III-b presents the results of our main specifications for the IDA. We regress 
IDA funding on board membership with country fixed-effects but without our 
control variables in column (1). In stark contrast to our findings for the IBRD, we 
find no significant association between these two variables. The results of our 
main specifications presented in columns (2) to (4), again, fail to find a 
statistically significant coefficient estimate on the board membership variable. As 
with the main IBRD specifications, the only control variable that is significant is 
that for the occurrence of a major war. Mirroring the IBRD case, we find that 
countries where there is a major ongoing war can expect a very large decrease in 
the amount of IDA funding they receive. 
In case there may be a fixed bonus to board membership rather than a 
proportional increase in funds, we employ the alternate specification using 
absolute commitment levels as the dependent variable since the former effect 
may escape detection in a specification using the logarithmic dependent variable. 
We run this alternate version of the main country fixed-effects regression in 
column (5) and that for the event-time specification in column (6). As in the main 
specifications, we fail to find a significant link between board membership and 
funding using absolute commitment levels. The major war variable remains 
negative, statistically significant at the 10% level. While in a very different 
context, these results echo the results of Neumayer (2003) who finds that IDA 
allocation are correlated with need and poverty but not political variables. 30 
 
The vast differences between our results for the IBRD and IDA raise 
interesting questions. Why would two institutions, similarly structured, exhibit 
such different behavior in terms of the association between board membership 
and funding? One plausible explanation is that this difference stems from the 
different missions of these two main World Bank bodies. The IDA’s exclusive 
focus on the poorest, neediest countries might well alter the dynamics of board 
politics and decision-making, reducing the effect of its institutional structure on 
outcomes. A related, but far more specific, explanation is that the difference 
results from the strong role of observable factors, such as per-capita income and 
region, in dictating IDA inter-country allocation since its early years. Testing 
between these two hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper, as this norm has 
been present with the organization since its founding, even if the IDA did not 
adopt specific formulas until 1977. That said, the correlation between IDA board 
membership and grants/loans—weak at all times—is weaker before 1977 
compared with  after, suggesting that the norm rather than the formula is the 
driving factor (results available upon request). 
 
5   Differential Treatment 
Upon finding that board membership does lead to higher IBRD commitments, 
we try to determine whether certain characteristics allow countries to better 31 
 
exploit board membership than other countries. To do this, we re-run primary 
fixed effects specification while including various interaction effects: 
 
ln(Loan Commitments) = β0+β1(Board Member)it++β1(Board Member x η)it 
+ β2(Bank Voting Power)it + β3(X)it + γt + δi + εit (4) 
 
where  η is the variable being interacted with the dummy variable ‘Board 
Member.’ 
First, we examine whether a country’s per capita GDP influences the amount 
of benefit it derives from board membership by interacting these two variables.  
It is possible that economically stronger developing countries may command 
more respect or influence, making them more able to cash in on insider status for 
greater loans.  Second, we interact board membership with political climate to 
determine whether the political climate in a country (its degree of autocracy or 
democracy) has an effect on its ability to convert board membership into 
funding.  For example, the board may be biased against more autocratic 
governments, limiting such governments’ ability to utilize an insider position.  
Third, we look at whether the effect of board membership on World Bank 
funding is significantly different in the years before and after the Cold War by 
interacting board membership with a dummy variable indicating whether the 
year is after 1990.  The end of the Cold War altered the balance of power in the 
international system and, consequently, might have influenced the operations of 32 
 
international institutions in a noteworthy manner. Fourth, we interact board 
membership with a dummy indicating whether a country has served on the 
board for more than fourteen years – countries that have served for 
approximately one-third of the years in our data set. It is plausible that countries 
that have served for longer have more experience and command more respect on 
the board, leading to a better ability to take advantage of board membership.  On 
the other hand, countries that get the chance to serve on the board many times 
may be less eager to exploit the opportunity, or may see the returns spread over 
multiple board terms.  
Fifth, we look at the interaction effect between board membership and board 
voting power.  This pools the dummy and the scalar variables for board 
membership in the same regression and tests whether countries representing 
powerful groups achieve larger gains from board service. Finally, we interact 
board membership with a scaled measure of board voting power, which we label 
effective voting power. Since developed countries do not receive World Bank 
loans, we multiply the board voting power by the ratio of total votes to 
developing-country votes. With this measure, a developing country that shares 
its board seats with developed countries (who are not clamoring for loans) 
should have a larger effective vote than a developing country that shares its 
board seats with other developing countries.  
The results of these applications of specification (4) for IBRD commitments 
are reported in Table V-a. In column (1), we find a positive but not statistically 33 
 
significant estimate of the coefficient of the interaction between per capita GDP 
and board membership. The interaction between board membership and political 
climate in column (2) offers a negative coefficient estimate, but one that is also 
not statistically significant. Column (3) shows that the financial bonus from 
board membership is substantially higher in the post-1990 part of the data set, 
potentially reflecting shifting power in the post-Cold War world. The estimate on 
the interaction term in column (4) suggests that countries that have served on the 
board for more than fourteen years in the data set see higher returns to board 
membership, though this coefficient estimate is not quite statistically significant. 
In column (5) we find a positive but not statistically significant effect, indicating 
that it is hard to determine whether countries with higher amounts of board 
voting power turn their board membership into higher IBRD commitments. 
Finally, in column (6) we find that statistically-significant additional leverage is 
gained from representing the votes of developed countries who are not 
interested in extra loans for themselves. 
Consistent with our lack of significant findings in our main and other IDA 
specifications described in Section 4, our differential treatment of board 
membership also fails to divine any statistically significant effect. Table V-b 
presents the results of these regressions. 34 
 
6   Conclusions 
The evidence in the preceding analysis exposes a weakness in the design of the 
World Bank’s decision-making structure. A seat on the IBRD’s Board of 
Executive Directors is not only significant for intangible reasons such as the 
international prestige associated with the position. IBRD executive directors 
reward themselves with a large increase in loan commitments to their home 
countries. On average, a developing country serving on the board can expect a 
doubling of its normal funding levels. In absolute terms, board membership is 
rewarded with a nearly $60 million bonus, on average. Furthermore, it appears 
that board membership, rather than omitted trends or alternative explanations, 
drives much of this striking effect.  
The evidence also suggests that returns to board membership increase 
following the Cold War and for developing countries that are able to throw 
around the voting power of developed countries that they represent on the 
board. Yet we also report a test that reveals that the story is not simply one of 
rules and abuse. When we compare executive directors to their alternates, we 
find no significant difference in their additional loans—even though the 
executive director wields much more formal power. If it were simply about 
formal institutional power, we should have found a distinction between 
executive directors and alternates.  35 
 
Instead, our analysis suggests that the reward to board membership may 
stem from the formation of a sort of insider culture in the boardroom, as opposed 
to being solely a function of voting rights. In Congress, we tolerate pork-barrel 
politics and logrolling as a cost of the political process. But we should be more 
skeptical for international appropriations committees, whose power is 
determined by a much less structured international system. If board membership 
were egalitarian, with all countries having the opportunity to serve on a regular 
basis, our findings might not be troubling. However, a majority of World Bank 
member countries never or rarely get a seat at the table. As an additional 
warning, research from corporate finance has shown that firms with 
overcompensated directors, and with weak shareholder rights underperform 
(Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). 
While we find strong results for the IBRD, we find no significant association 
between board membership and IDA funding. This stark contrast between two 
institutions with similar decision-making structures suggests that this 
institutional design may not always be problematic. The difference may be 
caused by the IDA’s exclusive focus on the world’s poorest and neediest 
countries, or by its strong norm of using external information to drive inter-
country allocation, suggesting that governance challenges can be overcome 
through a less discretionary mandate.  36 
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TABLE I-a                  Data, Means, and Variances 
          
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation 
           
IBRD          
Board Member (dummy)  5645  0.076  0.265 
Board Voting Power (% total)  5645  0.239  0.854 
Bank Voting Power (% total)  5186  0.306  0.508 
Alternate Board Member (dummy)  5645  0.087  0.281 
ln(Per capita rGDP, $1995 millions)  4751  8.033  0.999 
ln(Population, thousands)  5409  8.483  1.897 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  5645  0.071  0.256 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  4456  -1.134  7.405 
IBRD Commitments ($1996 millions)  5645  92.25  300.3 
ln(IBRD Commitments, $1996 
millions)  5645  5.443  8.500 
Received Any IBRD Funding (dummy)   5645  0.293  0.455 
           
IDA          
Board Member (dummy)  5645  0.076  0.265 
Board Voting Power (% total)  5645  0.237  0.866 
Bank Voting Power (% total)  4575  0.349  0.506 
Alternate Board Member (dummy)  5645  0.086  0.281 
ln(Per capita rGDP, $1995 millions)  4751  8.033  0.999 
ln(Population, thousands)  5409  8.483  1.897 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  5645  0.071  0.256 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  4456  -1.134  7.405 
IDA Commitments ($1996 millions)  5645  36.71  144.3 
ln(IDA Commitments, $1996 
millions)  5645  5.175  8.105 
Received Any IDA Funding (dummy)  5645  0.291  0.454 
           





TABLE I-b                                  Who Serves on the Board of Executive Directors? 
     
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation 
IBRD    
     
Statistics for Board Members    
Bank Voting Power (% total)  420 1.193 1.179 
Per capita rGDP (US$1995 millions)  407 4751 4242 
Population (thousands)  429 187734 344052 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  429 0.091 0.288 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  413 0.123 7.386 
IBRD Commitments (US$1996)  429 387.3 637.4 
     
Statistics for Alternate Board Members    
Bank Voting Power (% total)  489 0.438 0.411 
Per capita rGDP (US$1995 millions)  420 5613 5302 
Population (thousands)  447 31693 40091 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  489 0.070 0.255 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  436 -0.661 7.254 
IBRD Commitments (US$1996)  489 165.9 367.9 
     
Statistics for Non-EDs and Non-Alternates   
Bank Voting Power (% total)  4277 0.204 0.262 
Per capita rGDP (US$1995 millions)  3924 5021 6206 
Population (thousands)  4533 13442 42881 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  4727 0.069 0.253 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  3607 -1.335 7.411 
IBRD Commitments (US$1996)  4727 57.85 217.6 
     
IDA    
     
Statistics for Board Members    
Bank Voting Power (% total)  391 1.154 1.152 
Per capita rGDP (US$1995 millions)  406 4760 4244 
Population (thousands)  428 188133 344356 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  428 0.091 0.288 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  412 0.141 7.387 
IBRD Commitments (US$1996)  428 172.3 435.9 
     
Statistics for Alternate Board Members    
Bank Voting Power (% total)  427 0.528 0.511 
Per capita rGDP (US$1995 millions)  419 5624 5303 
Population (thousands)  446 31762 40110 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  488 0.070 0.255 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  435 -0.646 7.256 
IBRD Commitments (US$1996)  488 49.37 146.75 
     
Statistics for Non-EDs and Non-Alternates   
Bank Voting Power (% total)  3757 0.245 0.249 
Per capita rGDP (US$1995 millions)  3926 5019 6205 
Population (thousands)  4535 13441 42872 
Major War (>1000 deaths, dummy)  4729 0.069 0.253 
Political Climate (scale -1 to 1)  3609 -1.338 7.410 







        
TABLE III-a  OLS Estimates of IBRD Commitments in US$1996 on Board Membership 
Dependent variable:  log  log log log 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
     
Board Member  1.464  1.382     1.509 
   (1.99)**  (1.97)*     (1.84)* 
Board Voting Power        0.539    
         (2.49)**    
Bank Voting Power     0.967  0.781  0.93 
      (0.88)  (0.71)  (0.83) 
ln(per capita rGDP)     1.982  1.998  1.96 
      (-1.6)  (1.6)  (1.57) 
ln(Population)     0.368  0.393  0.331 
      (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.1) 
Major War     -1.881  -1.882  -1.915 
      (2.51)**  (2.51)**  (2.55)** 
Political Climate     -0.01  -0.011  -0.011 
      (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
entry - 3 years           -0.835 
            (1.15) 
entry - 2 years           0.503 
            (0.65) 
entry - 1 year           0.054 
            (0.07) 
exit + 1 year           -0.096 
            (0.1) 
exit + 2 years           0.912 
            (1.02) 
Observations  5645  4061  4061  4061 
# of countries  173  135  135  135 
R-squared  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.08 
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the country 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses       




   
            
TABLE III-b            OLS Estimates of IDA Commitments in US$1996 on Board 
Dependent variable:  log  log  log log absolute  absolute
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
           
Board Member  -0.007  0.328     0.408  9.03  8.585 
   (0.01)  (0.47)     (-0.55)  (0.5)  (0.61) 
Board Voting Power     0.042          
         (0.24)          
Bank Voting Power     -0.672  -0.641  -0.71  -32.368  -32.268 
      (0.51)  (0.49)  (0.54)  (0.86)  (0.86) 
ln(per capita rGDP)     -1.531  -1.516  -1.542  -13.077  -12.811 
      (1.12)  (1.1)  (1.12)  (0.62)  (0.61) 
ln(Population)     -0.09  -0.064  -0.088  25.799  25.775 
      (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.92)  (0.92) 
Major War     -2.309  -2.311  -2.292  -38.292  -38.376 
      (3.19)***  (3.19)***  (3.16)***  (1.70)*  (1.69)* 
Political Climate     0.013  0.014  0.011  -0.248  -0.24 
      (0.38)  (0.4)  (0.33)  (0.63)  (0.61) 
entry - 3 years           0.433     -10.77 
            (0.59)     (1.11) 
entry - 2 years           1.068     8.04 
            (1.47)     (0.83) 
entry - 1 year           0.683     -3.415 
            (0.95)     (0.49) 
exit + 1 year           -0.452     -3.009 
            (0.64)     (0.58) 
exit + 2 years           -0.802     -4.285 
            (1.54)     (0.63) 
Observations  5624  3619  3619  3619  3619  3619 
# of countries  173  122  122  122  122  122 
R-squared  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05 
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the country level 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses             













TABLE IV           OLS Estimates of IBRD Commitments in US$1996 on Board Membership -- Alternate Specifications
Dependent variable:  absolute  absolute logit logit log  log
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
        
Board Member  59.758  72.256  0.513  0.575  1.835  1.739 
   (1.90)*  (2.08)**  (1.64)  (1.55)  (2.38)**  (2.02)** 
Alternate Board Member              1.953  2.468 
               (3.12)***  (3.33)*** 
Bank Voting Power  62.687  55.917  0.521  0.515  0.995  1.135 
   (1.2)  (1.06)  (0.88)  (0.86)  (0.95)  (1.1) 
ln(per capita rGDP)  113.717  111.489  1.017  1.008  1.867  1.768 
   (1.73)*  (1.67)*  (1.91)*  (1.89)*  (1.5)  (1.41) 
ln(Population)  -67.594  -68.569  -0.277  -0.292  0.561  0.582 
   (0.81)  (0.82)  (0.19)  (0.2)  (0.18)  (0.19) 
Major War  -34.029  -35.204  -1.06  -1.093  -1.825  -1.86 
   (1.34)  (1.39)  (2.89)***  (3.01)***  (2.46)**  (2.53)** 
Political Climate  -1.734  -1.839  0.005  0.005  -0.008  -0.005 
   (1.13)  (1.24)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.14) 
BM entry - 3 years     -7.76     -0.418     -1.676 
      (0.29)     (1.42)     (2.09)** 
BM entry - 2 years     6.309     0.253     -0.24 
      (0.22)     (0.81)     (0.3) 
BM entry - 1 year     74.235     -0.121     -0.654 
      (1.75)*     (0.39)     (0.82) 
BM exit + 1 year     -12.589     -0.09     -0.038 
      (0.52)     (0.23)     (0.04) 
BM exit + 2 years     40.952     0.491     1.033 
      (0.92)     (1.28)     (1.15) 
Alternate entry - 3                 0.366 
                  (0.55) 
Alternate entry - 2                 1.763 
                  (2.74)*** 
Alternate entry - 1 year                 2.38 
                  (3.17)*** 
Alternate exit + 1 year                 0.483 
                  (0.65) 
Alternate exit + 2 years                 0.398 
                  (0.5) 
Observations  4061  4061  3148  3148  4061  4061 
# of countries  135  135        135  135 
R-squared  0.1  0.1        0.08  0.09 
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the country level 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses             













TABLE V-a                  OLS Estimates of IBRD Commitments on Board Membership 
Differential Treatment                      Dependent variable: ln(IBRD Commitments) in US$1996    
Board Member interacted with:  GDP  Political Climate Year > 1990 >14 Years as ED Board Voting Power Effective  Voteb
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
          
Board Member  -2.688  1.369  0.326  0.539  -1.917  -0.521 
   (0.53)  (2.04)**  (0.37)  (0.76  (0.98)  (0.56) 
Board Voting Powera              0.485    
               (1.43)    
Effective Voting Powerab                 0.047 
                  (0.4) 
Bank Voting Power  0.877  0.776  0.96  0.724  0.499  0.863 
   (0.81)  (0.72)  (0.84)  (0.72)  (0.43)  (0.8) 
ln(per capita rGDP)  1.932  1.999  1.76  2.001  1.282  1.22 
   (1.59)  (1.62)  (1.51)  (1.62)  (1.04)  (0.98) 
ln(Population)  0.345  0.268  0.484  0.307  0.717  0.466 
   (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.1)  (0.22)  (0.14) 
Major War  -1.894  -1.866  -2.024  -1.903  -1.69  -1.697 
   (2.54)**  (2.47)***  (2.75)***  (2.55)**  (2.33)**  (2.31)** 
Political Climate  -0.009  -0.002  -0.008  -0.007  0  0.001 
   (0.23) (0.05)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
BM*ln(per capita rGDP)  0.504                
   (0.78)                
BM*Political Climate     -0.114             
      (1.12)             
BM*Post1990        3.126          
         (2.53)**          
BM*(>14 Years as ED)           2.294       
            (1.45)       
BM*Board Voting Power              0.943    
               (1.52)    
BM*Effective Voting Powerb                 0.406 
                  (2.28)** 
Observations  4061  4061  4061  4061  3673  3673 
# of countries  135  135  135  135  134  134 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.06 
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the       
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%             
aThese values are assigned to all countries in the group regardless of their BM          
bEffective vote is Board Voting Power multiplied by the total votes per BM divided by the total developing country votes.    47 
 
 
TABLE V-b                    OLS Estimates of IDA Commitments on Board Membership 
Differential Treatment                       Dependent variable: ln(IDA Commitments) in US$1996    
Board Member interacted with:   GDP Political Climate Year > 1990 >14 Years as ED Board Voting Power Effective  Voteb
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
           
Board Member  -3.027  0.296  0.037  0.024  1.76  0.385 
   (0.71)  (0.46)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.85)  (-0.39) 
Board Voting Powera              0.143    
               (0.49)    
Effective Voting Powerab                 0 
                  (0.24) 
Bank Voting Power  -0.806  -0.752  -0.7  -0.754  -0.314  -0.316 
   (0.57)  (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.54)  (0.4)  (0.41) 
ln(per capita rGDP)  -1.585  -1.524  -1.597  -1.527  -2.051  -2.022 
   (1.16)  (1.11)  (1.17)  (1.11)  (1.44)  (1.43) 
ln(Population)  -0.102  -0.147  -0.013  -0.128  0.267  0.174 
   (0.03)  (0.04)  (0)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
Major War  -2.318  -2.302  -2.348  -2.314  -2.498  -2.502 
   (3.20)* (3.19)***  (3.23)***  (3.19)***  (3.27)***  (3.28)*** 
Political Climate  0.014  0.017  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.012 
   (0.41)  (0.48)  (0.4)  (0.42)  (0.38)  (0.37) 
BM*ln(per capita rGDP)  0.42                
   (0.78)                
BM*Political Climate     -0.044             
      (0.46)             
BM*Post1990        0.871          
         (0.93)          
BM*(>14 Years as ED)           0.776       
            (0.52)       
BM*Board Voting Power              -0.647    
               (0.97)    
BM*Effective Voting Powerb                 -0.195 
                  (0.87) 
Observations  3619  3619  3619  3619  3293  3293 
# of countries  122  122  122  122  121  121 
R-squared  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the country level    
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%             
aThese values are assigned to all countries in the group regardless of their BM status.       
bEffective vote is Board Voting Power multiplied by the total votes per BM divided by the total developing country votes.    48 
 
TABLE A1
Dependent variable: log log abs logit log log log log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Board Member 1.38 1.488 61.522 0.508 0.549 0.61 1.692 0.699
(2.04)** (1.83)* (1.96)* (1.63) (2.17)** (2.05)** (2.20)** (2.54)**
Alternate Board Member 1.314 0.648
(1.95)* (3.06)***
Bank Voting Power 1.349 1.322 70.687 0.428 0.263 0.24 1.324 0.273
(0.96) (0.92) (1.23) (0.51) (0.68) (0.61) (0.95) (0.74)
ln(per capita rGDP) 3.425 3.406 154.903 1.273 0.676 0.666 3.311 0.638
(1.92)* (1.91)* (1.52) (1.85)* (1.54) (1.51) (1.84)* (1.45)
ln(Population) -3.455 -3.506 -252.03 -1.742 0.137 0.126 -3.463 0.201
(0.65) (0.66) (1.05) (0.91) (0.14) (0.12) (0.66) (0.2)
Major War -1.379 -1.432 -49.105 -0.679 -0.583 -0.594 -1.382 -0.565
(1.44) (1.5) (1.22) (1.56) (2.28)** (2.33)** (1.44) (2.23)**
Political Climate -0.109 -0.109 -4.017 -0.04 -0.007 -0.008 -0.103 -0.007
(1.5) (1.5) (1.14) (1.25) (0.54) (0.57) (1.45) (0.51)
entry-3 years -0.84 -0.244
(1.14) (0.93)
entry-2 years 0.457 0.156
(0.57) (0.58)
entry-1 year -0.067 0.168
(0.08) (0.59)
exit + 1 year -0.117 0.006
(0.13) (0.02)
exit + 2 years 0.941 0.266
(1) (0.84)
Observations 2131 2131 2131 1792 4061 4061 2131 4061
# of countries 59 59 59 135 135 59 135
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.1
Countries with service = 0
a
dropped dropped dropped dropped included included dropped included
Zero Commitment Values included included included included changed to 12.5 changed to 12.5 included changed to 12.5
aThe 'service' variable represents the total number of years a country has served on the board in the data set
                                  OLS Estimates of IBRD Commitments in US$1996 on Board Membe
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the country level
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%49 
 
TABLE A2             OLS Estimates of IBRD Commitments in US$1996 on Board Membership -- Robustness Checks    
   Placebo Test  Placebo Test                
Dependent variable:  log  abs  log  abs  log  abs    
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    
                       
Board Membera  -0.66  -64.46  1.271  66.99  1.063  26.26    
   (0.97)  (2.08)**  (1.56)  (2.03)**  (1.72)*  (0.97)    
Bank Voting Power  1.162  82.88  0.067  30.6  -0.405  111    
   (0.98)  (1.54)  (0.04)  (0.40)  (0.27)  (1.38)    
ln(per capita rGDP)  2.147  126.7  2.929  46.67  0.235  -9.635    
   (1.61)  (1.74)*  (2.43)**  (1.60)  (0.23)  (0.45)    
ln(Population)  -0.55  -103.9  1.919  -50.27  -1.445  -30.59    
   (0.14)  (0.99)  (0.49)  (0.55)  (0.46)  (0.46)    
Major War  -1.918  -37.36  -2.3  -61.45  -2.204  -30.84    
   (2.43)**  (1.35)  (2.50)  (2.09)**  (3.03)***  (1.21)    
Political Climate  -0.022  -2.137  -0.032  -0.907  -0.03  -1.102    
   (0.51)  (1.22)  (0.80)  (0.77)  (0.61)  (0.76)    
Observations  3696  3696  2720  2720  3640  3640    
# of countries  135  135  115  115  134  134    
R-squared  0.08  0.1  0.09  0.08  0.26  0.33    
Country groups 
includedb  all  all  limited  limited  all  all    
Group-year fixed 
effects  no  no  no  no  yes  yes    
Countries with service 
= 0c  included  included  included  included  included  included    
Zero Commitment 
Values  included  included  included  included  included  included    
All regressions include country and year fixed effects and use standard errors clustered at the country level       
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses                
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%                
a In the placebo regressions, each of this variable's values is replaced by the value of the same variable ten years 
prior       
b The regressions that use the limited sample of groups exclude groups that have no meaningful rotation of representation    
c The 'service' variable represents the total number of years a country has served on the board in the data set       
Italicized estimates are those for when each of the particular variable's values is replaced by the value of the same variable ten years prior    
 
 